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The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Daniel F. Piar ∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, employment discrimination class actions have be-
come well-publicized, high-stakes events.1 Enormous monetary ex-
posures, sensational allegations, and aggressive litigation tactics have 
brought these cases to prominence in legal circles, the business 
community, and the public eye. There are signs, however, that this 
trend could be slowed or even halted by a ten-year-old civil rights 
law whose implications in this area are just beginning to be felt in the 
federal courts. 
Employment discrimination class actions are typically brought 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As initially passed, 
the 1964 Act provided only equitable relief to victims of employ-
ment discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded these 
remedies by providing compensatory and punitive damages to vic-
tims of intentional discrimination in the workplace. The 1991 Act 
also bestowed the right to a jury trial on both parties in such cases. 
Ironically, however, the same law that was designed to provide 
additional remedies to individuals may have made it more difficult 
for them to bring class claims. The availability of substantial mone-
tary damages to Title VII plaintiffs may destroy the homogeneity of 
remedy required to maintain a class action under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), a concern that was not present when in-
junctive relief was the predominant remedy under the statute. The 
individualized issues of proof and liability raised by the availability of 
damages may destroy the commonality necessary to maintain a class 
 
 ∗  J.D., Yale Law School, 1994; Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The views 
expressed in this Article are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of Kilpatrick 
Stockton LLP or its clients. 
 1. See David McNaughton, The Lawyer Taking on Coke: Cyrus Mehri Looks for a “Public 
Dimension,” in This Case, Race Relations in the United States, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 2, 
1999, at P-1. 
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action under Rule 23(b)(3) and may render other means of adjudica-
tion superior to a class action within the meaning of the Rule. And 
the availability of a jury trial under Title VII may raise Seventh 
Amendment bars to the bifurcation schemes that were traditionally 
used to manage class claims of discrimination. As one court has 
summarized, “Certification of many Title VII cases as class actions 
may no longer be appropriate, given the expanded damages now 
made available under Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”2 
This Article will examine the ways in which the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991 has altered the landscape of Title VII class actions and will 
analyze the ways in which courts have attempted—with varying de-
grees of plausibility—to surmount the obstacles to class litigation 
raised by the 1991 Act. It will also suggest ways in which these ob-
stacles might be avoided in the future, if, indeed, they should be 
avoided at all. 
II. TITLE VII AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment 
discrimination based on race, religion, sex, color, and national ori-
gin.3 In the decades since 1964, Title VII cases have become a staple 
of the federal court system and a prominent means of addressing 
both real and perceived discrimination on the job.4 As initially 
passed, Title VII provided only declaratory, injunctive, and other eq-
uitable relief (principally back and front pay) to victims of discrimina-
tion.5 This remedial scheme was consistent with those in other fed-
 
 2. Taylor v. Flagstar Bank, 181 F.R.D. 509, 519 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (citation omit-
ted); see also Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 237 (W.D. Tex. 
1999) (noting that the class action “may no longer be a valid vehicle” for employment dis-
crimination claims seeking money damages). 
 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (1994). 
 4. In 1999, employment discrimination cases in general accounted for 8.6% of all fed-
eral civil filings. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United 
States Courts, Table C-2A (1999). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g) (1994). Back pay is compensation for past income lost as a 
result of discrimination. Front pay is compensation for lost future income (i.e., money that the 
plaintiff would have made in the future absent unlawful discrimination). Front pay is consid-
ered a monetary substitute for the remedies of reinstatement or promotion and is typically 
awarded where hostility between the parties makes reinstatement infeasible or where no job 
openings are available at the time of judgment to enforce a remedial promotion. See Cassino v. 
Reichold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); Briseno v. Central Technical 
Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1984). Both back pay and front pay 
are generally regarded as equitable remedies rather than money damages. See United States v. 
5PIA-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:07 PM 
305] The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions 
 307 
eral workplace discrimination statutes before and since, which have 
frequently omitted compensatory or punitive damages provisions.6 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 strengthened Title VII’s remedial 
scheme by authorizing compensatory and punitive damages in cases 
of intentional employment discrimination.7 While understanding the 
damages provisions of the 1991 Act is essential to understanding its 
impact on Title VII class actions, there is no indication in the legisla-
tive history that Congress considered the effect these provisions 
might have on class litigation as opposed to individual claims. 
The 1991 Act’s enhanced damages provisions were designed to 
compensate victims of discrimination for humiliation, trauma, physi-
cal distress, medical expenses, and other economic and noneconomic 
harms caused by workplace discrimination. They were also intended 
to punish and deter employers who acted “with malice or with reck-
less indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved 
[employee].”8 In passing these provisions, Congress intended to 
“confirm that the principle of anti-discrimination is as important as 
the principle that prohibits assaults, batteries, and other intentional 
injuries to people”9 and to “ensure compensation commensurate 
with the harms suffered by victims of intentional discrimination.”10 
 
 
Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921 (5th Cir. 1973) (back pay); Kramer v. Logan County 
Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1998) (front pay). 
 6. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994) (provid-
ing affirmative relief, including back pay, for victims of unfair labor practices); Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) (providing back pay, affirmative relief, and liq-
uidated damages for claimants); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 
626(b) (1994) (adopting remedies provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act); Uniformed Ser-
vices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act § 2(a), 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d) (1994) (pro-
viding injunctive relief and liquidated damages for victims of anti-military discrimination). 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Intentional discrimination cases are also known as 
“disparate treatment” cases. In cases of unintentional discrimination, or “disparate impact” 
cases, remedies remained equitable under the 1991 Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 15 (1991). 
 10. Id. at 18. Among the anecdotes included in the House report was that of a sexual 
harassment victim who endured sleeplessness, severe neck pain, and nausea at work but was 
awarded only one dollar in nominal damages under the pre-1991 remedial scheme. Id. at 66–
67. Another harassment victim was fired for being pregnant, lost her insurance, and was 
shunned by her hospital, which threatened the seizure of her property to pay her medical bills. 
She prevailed in her discrimination case and was compensated for lost income and medical ex-
penses but received nothing for her “years of stress and humiliation.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-
40(II), at 25–26 (1991). 
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The 1991 revisions also were motivated by a remedial anomaly in 
race discrimination cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1866,11 which for-
bids racially motivated interference with the right to enter contracts, 
had long been held to confer a right of action for job discrimination 
on the theory that such discrimination constituted interference with 
the right to enter contracts of employment.12 Because unlimited 
compensatory and punitive damages were available under § 1981,13 
plaintiffs claiming employment discrimination based on race could 
recover full damages, while those claiming other forms of discrimina-
tion could not. Congress therefore made damages available for all Ti-
tle VII plaintiffs in part to address this perceived inconsistency.14 
Finally, the 1991 amendments were seen as an enforcement 
mechanism: the House Report declares that the additional remedies 
are necessary to “encourage citizens to act as private attorneys gen-
eral” in enforcing Title VII.15 To protect the Seventh Amendment 
rights of parties involved in such claims, the Act made trial by jury 
available in cases seeking compensatory and punitive damages.16 The 
sum of compensatory and punitive damages under the 1991 Act is 
capped on a sliding scale ranging from $50,000 to $300,000, de-
pending on the size of the employer.17 
The language of the House Report on the 1991 Act places great 
emphasis on the nature and extent of the harms suffered by some 
victims of discrimination.18 It is clear that the House majority felt 
strongly that intentional discrimination should be redressed with 
both compensation and retribution where appropriate, and there is 
every indication that Congress viewed itself as the white knight of 
those whom the law protected. In subsequent litigation, however, 
 
 11. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)). 
 12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975). 
 13. See id. at 459–60. 
 14. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 65 (1991). 
 15. Id. at 64–65. That effort has been successful. Employment discrimination filings, 
which as of 1990 had stabilized at approximately eight to nine thousand cases per year in the 
federal courts, increased to 12,962 filings in 1993, 19,059 in 1995, and 22,490 in 1999. 
Compare Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts, 
Table C-2A (1997) with Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the 
United States Courts, Table C-2A (1999). While these are not all Title VII claims, Title VII 
remains the broadest and most widely used employment discrimination statute. 
 16. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 29 (1991). 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). 
 18. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 66–69 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 25–
28 (1991). 
5PIA-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:07 PM 
305] The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions 
 309 
both litigants and courts would wrestle with the potentially serious 
(and apparently unforeseen) restrictions imposed by these individual 
remedies on the maintenance of Title VII class actions. 
III. THE RULE 23 REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS ACTIONS 
The original Title VII remedies fit neatly within the procedural 
scheme established for the certification and maintenance of class ac-
tions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19 A class 
must pass two major tests to be certified under Rule 23. First, it 
must possess the four attributes required by Rule 23(a): numerosity, 
typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation. Specifically, 
(1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable” (numerosity); (2) there must be “questions of law or 
fact common to the class” (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses 
of the class representatives must be “typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class” (typicality); and (4) the representative parties must be 
able to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” (ade-
quacy of representation).20 
Once these requirements are met, the class then must fit within 
one of the three categories established under Rule 23(b).21 
 
 19. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) provides as follows: 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class 
would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the 
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party oppos-
ing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to 
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their in-
terests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally ap-
plicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the inter-
est of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the contro-
versy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or 
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Rule 23(b)(1) generally applies when individual adjudication 
would risk establishing inconsistent standards of behavior for the 
party opposing the class or when adjudication of the class representa-
tives’ claims would either dispose of the interests of other potential 
plaintiffs or impede their ability to recover. The textbook 23(b)(1) 
class involves a set of claims against a limited fund whose resources 
might be exhausted by initial plaintiffs to the detriment of subse-
quent claimants.22 Rule 23(b)(1) typically does not apply in em-
ployment discrimination class actions. There is little risk of establish-
ing inconsistent standards of behavior for a defendant employer, as 
the standards to be enforced are clear: do not discriminate. Similarly, 
class discrimination claims are not claims upon a limited fund as the 
Rule 23 Advisory Committee understood the concept but are efforts 
to remedy and deter certain types of harm by recovering equitable, 
compensatory, or punitive relief for persons who have been wronged. 
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when a defendant has “acted or refused to 
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making ap-
propriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 
with respect to the class as a whole.”23 Under the original Title VII 
remedies, which were entirely equitable, Rule 23(b)(2) was the prin-
cipal basis for certifying employment discrimination class actions.24 
Indeed, the 1966 Advisory Committee comments to Rule 23(b)(2) 
singled out civil rights classes as paradigmatic: “Illustrative [of 
23(b)(2) classes] are various actions in the civil-rights field where a 
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class . . . .”25 
Rule 23(b)(2) comes with an important caveat, according to the Ad-
visory Committee: “The subdivision does not extend to cases in 
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly 
to money damages.”26 While the Advisory Committee did not at-
tempt to define the term “predominantly” (which appears nowhere 
in Rule 23(b)(2) itself), this “predominance” requirement has been  
 
 
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; 
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. 
 22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966). 
 23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
 24. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997); Jefferson v. 
Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). 
 26. Id. 
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central to efforts to assess the impact of the 1991 Act on class litiga-
tion, as discussed below. 
The final Rule 23(b) category is Rule 23(b)(3), which permits 
certification where a court finds that “questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of the class predominate over any questions af-
fecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.”27 The “commonality” required by this section is a 
stricter test than that of commonality under Rule 23(a) and requires 
that the class members be “more bound together by a mutual inter-
est in the settlement of common questions than . . . divided by the 
individual members’ interest in the matters peculiar to them.”28 Rule 
23(b)(3) also requires a finding that a class action is superior to other 
methods of adjudication, such as the prosecution of consolidated or 
individual claims. Rule 23(b)(3) permits courts to consider a variety 
of factors in deciding whether to certify a class, including the inter-
ests of class members in controlling their claims individually, the ex-
istence of individual litigation concerning the same claims, the desir-
ability of concentrating class claims in the particular forum, the 
manageability of the class, and the desirability of certifying the class 
to avoid “negative value suits,” in which the cost of individual litiga-
tion would outweigh the potential individual recovery.29 
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are subject to an important “opt-out provi-
sion” imposed by Rule 23(c)(2). Under this provision, each potential 
member of a 23(b)(3) class is entitled to notice of the action, notice 
that all nonexcluded class members will be bound by the class judg-
ment, and notice of the member’s right to be excluded from the 
class upon request, leaving excluded members to a private right of 
action.30 This provision exists as a hedge against the individual inter-
ests of potential 23(b)(3) class members, especially with respect to 
their right to pursue and recover individual monetary damages. As 
the Advisory Committee noted, in many Rule 23(b)(3) cases, the in-
terests of individuals in pursuing their own claims “may be so strong 
 
 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); See also Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 93 C 
4862, 1994 WL 445149, at *7 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 16, 1994). 
 28. Id. at *11. 
 29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D); see also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 
F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
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here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether.”31 Even where 
those interests are not strong enough to bar a class action, Rule 
23(b)(3) recognizes that individual interests may still exist and must 
be respected as a matter of due process by allowing potential class 
members to choose to pursue their own claims instead of joining in 
with the class.32 
These Rule 23 requirements provide the procedural framework 
for class actions, and the interplay between those requirements, the 
remedies now afforded under Title VII, and the constitutional rights 
of the parties leads to the current uncertainties concerning the main-
tainability of Title VII class actions. 
IV. TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1991 
Before the passage of the 1991 Act, the courts had developed 
fairly well-defined procedures for certifying and managing Title VII 
class actions. These procedures were famously outlined and approved 
by the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States.33 Title VII class actions before 1991 typically involved 
allegations that the employer had engaged in a pattern and practice 
of intentional discrimination, were typically certified under Rule 
23(b)(2), and were typically handled in two phases. In the first, or 
liability phase, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving prima facie 
the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination—in other 
words, that discrimination was the employer’s “standard operating 
procedure.”34 This could be achieved through various combinations 
of statistical and anecdotal evidence.35 The employer then could at-
tempt to rebut the plaintiffs’ showing by demonstrating that the 
plaintiffs’ proof was “inaccurate or insignificant.”36 If the plaintiffs’ 
proof withstood challenge, then the pattern and practice was consid-
 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104–05 (1966). 
 32. See id. at 104–05; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999). 
 33. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 34. Id. at 336. 
 35. See id at 337. (statistical evidence); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. 
Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that liability phase can encompass “‘direct statistical 
evidence, anecdotal evidence . . . and any other evidence that bears on the issue of whether a 
pattern of discrimination existed’” (quoting Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 
1346, 1352 (D.N.J. 1996))). 
 36. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360–62 (1977). 
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ered proven and the court could grant classwide prospective relief, 
including injunctions and other remedial orders.37 To address indi-
vidual claims, such as those for back pay or reinstatement, this initial 
phase was followed by a remedial phase in which the court (or, in 
some cases, a special master) would determine the appropriate reme-
dies for the individual class members. In this second phase, each class 
member only had to show (1) that he experienced an adverse em-
ployment action and (2) the extent of any resulting loss. Because of 
the pattern and practice established in the first phase, each class 
member in the second phase enjoyed a rebuttable presumption that 
the adverse action and resulting loss were the product of discrimina-
tion. The employer then could attempt to rebut the presumption as 
to each class member and thereby avoid liability to that class member 
by proving that the disputed employment action had been taken for 
a nondiscriminatory reason.38 
For the most part, this paradigm worked smoothly under the eq-
uitable remedy scheme of the original 1964 Act. Class certification 
was largely unproblematic under Rule 23(b)(2) because declaratory 
and injunctive relief could be held to predominate absent the avail-
ability of money damages. (While individual class members could re-
cover money in the form of back or front pay, this was considered an 
equitable remedy that would not detract from the predominance of 
declaratory and injunctive relief.39) Moreover, the availability of only 
equitable remedies meant that there was no right to a jury trial, and 
thus courts were free to use devices such as special masters to handle 
individual claims as efficiently as possible in the second phase.40 All of 
this would change dramatically with the advent of the damages and 
jury trial remedies afforded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
V. TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1991 
The damages remedies provided by the 1991 Act have intro-
duced serious complications in the certification and management of 
 
 37. See id. at 361. 
 38. See id.; Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 39. See supra note 6; Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (authorizing use of special 
masters); Kraszewski v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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Title VII class actions under Rule 23. While plaintiffs had typically 
sought and obtained certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in such cases, 
the availability of substantial and individualized money damages has 
raised difficult questions about the predominance of declaratory and 
injunctive relief required by Rule 23(b)(2). It has also raised proce-
dural and constitutional questions about the need for or the 
availability of an opt-out procedure for 23(b)(2) cases in which 
individual claimants might want to reserve their monetary claims. 
As to 23(b)(3) classes, the highly individualized nature of claims 
for compensatory and punitive damages has raised questions under 
the commonality requirement of that rule, while courts have strug-
gled to determine whether a class of persons can be said to have suf-
ficient matters in common when each of them seeks a personalized 
remedy. Similarly, the presence of scores, hundreds, or even thou-
sands of unique claims for damages has greatly complicated the man-
ageability of Title VII classes, especially where the relevant damages 
issues must be resolved by juries upon the demand of either party. 
The presence of such claims increases the risk that a class action will 
degenerate in practice into a series of minitrials, thereby becoming 
unmanageable and defeating the efficiencies that class actions were 
designed to realize. In addition, the very high limits on damages un-
der the 1991 Act—up to $300,000 per plaintiff, depending on the 
size of the employer—may have eliminated the threat of negative 
value suits, which has been one of the primary bases for 23(b)(3) 
certification. 
The 1991 changes have also raised questions about the availabil-
ity of the Teamsters-style bifurcation that had been used in declara-
tory or injunctive-based class actions in the past. Attempts to apply 
such a process in light of the 1991 Act’s jury trial right may violate 
the Seventh Amendment rights of the litigants. Because of the nature 
of proof in employment discrimination cases, multiple juries might 
be required to decide identical or substantially related issues of fact 
in evaluating the various phases of such trials. 
Finally, the high damages limits under the 1991 Act have paved 
the way for “blackmail” class actions, in which a defendant’s mone-
tary exposure can be used by plaintiffs and their lawyers to force a 
settlement regardless of the merits of the case. 
Trial courts have begun to address these issues with some regu-
larity in Title VII cases, but these matters have only recently begun 
to make their way to the appellate courts. The varying approaches 
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taken by the courts—as well as their varying degrees of persuasive-
ness—indicate that these questions will continue to vex both litigants 
and judges for some time to come. 
A. The 23(b)(2) Class—The Problems of Predominance and Opt-Out 
Rights 
1. Rule 23(b)(2) and money damages 
Rule 23(b)(2) was designed for classes in which declaratory or 
injunctive relief is the predominant remedial issue. As the Federal 
Rules Advisory Committee explained in its comments to Rule 
23(b)(2), this section “does not extend to cases in which the appro-
priate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money dam-
ages.”41 Thus, a key question in the post-1991 litigation of Title VII 
class actions has been whether the availability of money damages 
means that such damages “predominate” over injunctive relief to 
render Rule 23(b)(2) unsuitable as a means of certifying a class. 
One difficulty in answering this question has been determining 
the definition of “predominantly.” The language of Rule 23(b)(2) 
does not absolutely rule out money damages for a 23(b)(2) class, 
and the Advisory Committee comments would apparently allow 
23(b)(2) certification in some circumstances where money damages 
are sought, so long as they are not the “exclusive” or “predominant” 
form of relief. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has stated in 
dicta that there is “at least a substantial possibility” that classes seek-
ing money damages can never be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) due 
to the lack of an opt-out provision by which individual claimants can 
elect to pursue their remedies apart from the class.42 Absent a more 
definitive holding, courts continue to be tasked with the job of de-
termining when money damages “predominate” over other types of 
relief in considering 23(b)(2) certification. 
 
 
 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966). 
 42. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994). The lack of clear author-
ity on this point was noted by the court in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc., 
185 F.R.D. 230, 244 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“[T]here is no clear cut decision as to whether Rule 
23(b)(2) contains an opt-out procedure.”). 
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2. The Allison v. Citgo approach 
To date, the most thorough appellate analysis of this issue in the 
Title VII context is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Allison v. Citgo Pe-
troleum Corp.43 Allison was an attempted Title VII race discrimina-
tion class action challenging hiring, promotion, training, and com-
pensation practices at Citgo’s Lake Charles, Louisiana, facility. The 
plaintiffs alleged both disparate impact and disparate treatment and 
sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief as well as com-
pensatory and punitive damages for a potential class of over one 
thousand members.44 The district court denied class certification, 
and the ensuing appeal raised numerous issues about the applicability 
of Rule 23 in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit relied on the pre-
dominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) in denying the plaintiffs’ 
request for 23(b)(2) certification.45 Because of Rule 23(b)(2)’s em-
phasis on classwide declaratory and injunctive relief, the appeals 
court found that the rule was designed to “concentrat[e] the litiga-
tion on common questions of law and fact” in order to evaluate and 
impose “uniform group remedies.”46 In the court’s view, this urge 
toward uniformity was demonstrated by the lack of an opt-out provi-
sion such as the one found under Rule 23(b)(3): 23(b)(2) class ac-
tions will bind class members without their consent precisely because 
all of them are affected in substantially the same way by the conduct 
complained of and will require substantially the same remedies to 
cure the problem.47 
Based on this principle of uniformity, the panel concluded that 
monetary relief will be found to “predominate” in 23(b)(2) actions 
 
 43. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 44. See id. at 407. 
 45. See id. at 412–16; Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 165 F.R.D. 463, 468–69 
(W.D. La. 1995). 
 46. Allison, 151 F.3d at 414. 
 47. See id. at 413. Some courts have nonetheless imposed an opt-out requirement on 
23(b)(2) classes. See, e.g., Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 4:98CV00739, 2000 WL 
1036245 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Tex. 2000) 
(extending opt-out rights to 23(b)(2) portion of hybrid Title VII class action); Martens v. 
Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that courts have discre-
tion to extend opt-out rights to 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes). It is not clear that this is proper, 
however, and the Supreme Court has recognized the “substantial possibility” that Rule 
23(b)(2) cannot be used to certify a class where money damages are sought. Ticor Title Ins. 
Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994). 
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“unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”48 
By “incidental,” the court explained, it meant “damages that flow 
directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming 
the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”49 One index of the 
“incidental” character of damages is the ease with which they can be 
calculated. “Ideally, incidental damages should be only those to 
which class members automatically would be entitled once liability to 
the class (or subclass) as a whole is established.”50 The determination 
of such “incidental” damages “should not require additional hear-
ings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case; it should 
neither introduce new and substantial legal or factual issues, nor en-
tail complex individualized determinations.”51 
Having determined the standard to be applied under Rule 
23(b)(2), the Allison court then held that compensatory damages 
were neither uniform nor ministerial enough to avoid “predominat-
ing” under Rule 23(b)(2). Because compensatory and punitive dam-
ages are not presumed from the violation of a person’s rights, even a 
plaintiff who could prove that he was discriminated against would be 
required to present “specific individualized” proof to establish his 
entitlement to damages. Damages for injuries stemming from dis-
crimination—which may include compensation for emotional 
trauma, accompanying physical injury, and any other tangible or in-
tangible consequences of discriminatory treatment—“cannot be cal-
culated by objective standards” and would introduce “new and sub-
stantial legal and factual issues” beyond those required to make a 
liability determination.52 Accordingly, such damages would not flow 
automatically from a finding of liability to the class, and such a class 
could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 
 
 
 48. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. The court noted that as a matter of precedent this was not inconsistent with 
cases allowing back pay under Rule 23(b)(2) because back pay is “an integral part of the statu-
tory equitable remedy.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 
1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
 52. Id. at 417–18. 
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3. The Allison dissent and the issue of back pay 
The Allison majority’s view of Rule 23(b)(2) is not a novel one.53 
The dissent nonetheless attacked the holding, claiming that the ma-
jority had created a rule that would absolutely preclude class certifi-
cation in 23(b)(2) cases seeking damages.54 That misstates the hold-
ing of the majority, which noted that the Advisory Committee had 
apparently meant to leave open the possibility of damages recoveries 
in some circumstances under Rule 23(b)(2), subject to the “pre-
dominance” analysis.55 More plausible was the dissent’s argument 
that the disallowance of damages could not be squared with the rou-
tine certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of classes seeking to recover 
back pay: “Although back pay has often been characterized as an eq-
uitable remedy for practical purposes, functionally there is little to 
distinguish back pay awards from compensatory damages. Both re-
quire complex individualized determinations.”56 This argument has 
superficial appeal but is not altogether persuasive. It is arguable that 
back pay proceedings are qualitatively different from damages deter-
minations. Back pay determinations typically do not require highly 
complex factual or legal adjudications. Instead, they involve only a 
determination of how much pay an employee lost and whether any 
offsets should be applied, for such things as interim earnings or fail-
ure to mitigate damages. While not entirely formulaic, such determi-
nations are made according to methods of calculation that are well 
developed and can be applied with some degree of classwide effi-
ciency, especially because they need not be determined by juries.57 At 
 
 53. Other courts in non-Title VII cases have read Rule 23(b)(2) much as the Allison 
court did and have denied 23(b)(2) certification where individualized damages determinations 
would be required if liability were found. See Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d 
263 (5th Cir. 2000) (following Allison and holding that it would be error to certify 23(b)(2) 
class under Fair Credit Reporting Act where monetary damages would not flow from declara-
tory relief but would require separate adjudication); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 
827 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that certification of 23(b)(2) class not required in environ-
mental contamination case where relief sought was primarily individualized money damages); 
Marascalco v. International Computerized Orthokeratology Soc’y, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 331 (N.D. 
Miss. 1998) (denying 23(b)(2) certification in action for breach of warranty and fraud; plain-
tiffs each sought damages in excess of $5 million, and availability of individual relief would de-
pend on varying individual circumstances going to elements of fraud). 
 54. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 426–27 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 55. See id. at 411. 
 56. Id. at 427 n.1 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
 57. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 1848–56 (3d ed. 1996). These calculations are perhaps most complex in cases involving 
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the least, one can plausibly argue that the calculation of such reme-
dies is inherently more uniform than the assessment of compensatory 
or punitive damages, which might involve medical, psychiatric, and 
other types of tangible and intangible proof that could differ widely 
among class members. 
Moreover, even assuming that back pay and damages are concep-
tually similar for purposes of Rule 23(b)(2), that does not mean that 
both should be available to a 23(b)(2) class. The monetary relief 
available to a 23(b)(2) Title VII class, in the majority’s view, is equi-
table (e.g., back pay). That relief is therefore determined by the 
court, without the additional procedural complications of a jury trial. 
Considering that the availability of equitable monetary remedies in 
class actions is entrenched as a matter of precedent, it would seem 
consistent with the homogeneity of fact and remedy contemplated 
by Rule 23(b)(2) to eschew the extra layer of fact finding and com-
plication that would be imposed on such proceedings by jury dam-
ages determinations. In other words, the availability of some mone-
tary recovery under Rule 23(b)(2) does not mean that there should 
be more, especially when that “more” is at odds with the homogene-
ity that Rule 23(b)(2) was supposed to represent. 
4. Other appellate views—Jefferson v. Ingersoll International, Inc. 
and Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers 
To date, only one other appellate court has considered the Rule 
23(b)(2) issue in a post-1991 Title VII class action. In Jefferson v. 
Ingersoll International, Inc., 58 the Seventh Circuit heard an inter-
locutory appeal from a Title VII class certification under Rule 
23(b)(2). The appeals court reversed and remanded the case to the 
trial court with instructions to consider, among other things, 
whether the money damages sought by the class were “more than 
incidental” to the requested equitable relief, and, if not, whether 
23(b)(2) certification is ever permissible when money damages are 
sought. In so doing, the court agreed with Allison that 23(b)(2) cer-
tification would be appropriate only where “monetary relief is inci-
dental to the equitable remedy—so tangential . . . that the due proc-
 
claims of discriminatory failure to hire or failure to promote, in which there may be more class 
members than available positions, and some method must therefore be used for allocating lim-
ited back pay to the class. Nonetheless, these procedures are also fairly well-established. See id. 
 58. 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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ess clause does not require notice [and the opportunity to opt 
out].”59 The Seventh Circuit therefore recognized that there are cir-
cumstances under Title VII in which the pursuit of money damages 
will prevent 23(b)(2) certification. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion did 
not, however, purport to direct how this issue should be resolved on 
remand. 
The Seventh Circuit later applied Jefferson to decertify another 
class in Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers,60 while 
continuing to avoid deciding the Rule 23 issues. In Lemon, members 
of a local union filed a Title VII class action, alleging that the union 
discriminated against women and minorities in its hiring referral sys-
tem. The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) with-
out imposing an opt-out provision, but the appellate court reversed. 
Relying on Jefferson, the court held that the seeking of individual 
damages “jeopardizes [the] presumption of cohesion and 
homogeneity” by requiring “judicial inquiry into the particularized 
merits of each individual plaintiff’s claim.”61 Further, it would violate 
due process to deprive individual class members of the chance to opt 
out of such a class where money damages were at issue, precisely be-
cause of this potential divergence of interests.62 Accordingly, the 
court held that the trial judge had abused his discretion by certifying 
a 23(b)(2) class without giving the class members a chance to opt 
out. On remand, as it had in Jefferson, the court directed the trial 
judge to consider three options: (1) certifying the class under Rule 
23(b)(3); (2) certifying the equitable issues under Rule 23(b)(2) and 
the legal issues under Rule 23(b)(3); or (3) certifying a Rule 
23(b)(2) class but imposing an opt-out provision.63 As in Jefferson, 
the appeals court did not consider whether any of the three options 
themselves might be improper (for example, whether a class seeking 
money damages can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) at all), nor did 
it tell the lower court how the issue should be resolved.64 
 
 59. Id. at 898–99. The court also suggested (without deciding) that the injunctive as-
pects of the case could be severed from the other claims and certified separately under Rule 
23(b)(2). The issue of bifurcation of class claims is discussed infra Part V.C. 
 60. 216 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 61. Id. at 580. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at 581–82. 
 64. The Eastern District of Arkansas relied upon Jefferson and Lemon and adopted their 
proposed third option, certifying a Title VII class under Rule 23(b)(2) and imposing an opt-
out provision. See Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 4:98CV00739, 2000 WL 1036245 
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5. Other post-1991 cases restricting 23(b)(2) certification 
District courts that have considered 23(b)(2) certification under 
Title VII both before and after Allison have generally agreed that the 
predominance analysis is necessary, and a number of those courts 
have rejected attempts to certify employment discrimination classes 
under Rule 23(b)(2) where compensatory and punitive damages 
were sought.65 
6. Post-1991 cases granting 23(b)(2) certification 
Other courts have granted 23(b)(2) certifications under Title 
VII. In Warnell v. Ford Motor Co.,66 the plaintiffs sought certification 
of a class of women alleging sexual harassment. The court certified 
the class under Rule 23(b)(2), noting that the plaintiffs sought a 
permanent injunction and a declaration of liability against Ford, and 
holding without further analysis that the accompanying claims for 
money damages were “incidental” to these equitable claims.67 The 
Northern District of California certified a 23(b)(2) class in Butler v. 
Home Depot, Inc.68 despite the plaintiffs’ substantial claims for money 
damages. Relying primarily on an analogy to pre-1991 cases involv-
 
(E.D. Ark. July 3, 2000). The court went on to adopt a Teamsters-style approach to the adju-
dication of the case without addressing the consequent Seventh Amendment problems (dis-
cussed below) or the contradictions inherent in the adjudication of individualized damages 
claims under Rule 23(b)(2) for those class members who did not opt out. 
 65. See Adams v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 162, 171 (D. Md. 2000) (denying 23(b)(2) 
certification to Title VII class; money damages “predominate” under 23(b)(2) when presence 
of monetary claims suggests that notice and right to opt out are necessary); Zapata v. IBP, 
Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 162 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding that monetary relief therefore predomi-
nated although plaintiffs alleged that only monetary relief would make class members whole for 
racially hostile work environment and denying 23(b)(2) certification); Griffin v. Home Depot, 
Inc., 168 F.R.D. 187, 190–91 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding without analysis that predominant 
relief sought by sex discrimination class is “economic and not injunctive” and denying 
23(b)(2) certification); Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 93 C 4862, 1994 WL 445149, 
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1994) (denying 23(b)(2) certification where complaint and class cer-
tification memorandum sought declaratory and injunctive relief but prayer for relief mentioned 
only compensatory, punitive and liquidated damages, and promotions and finding that plain-
tiffs’ “primary motivation” deemed money damages); Faulk v. Home Oil, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 
645 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (following Allison in denying 23(b)(2) certification in race discrimina-
tion case). 
 66. 189 F.R.D. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 67. See id. at 389 (quoting Senn v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 813 
(7th Cir. 1992). The Warnell court rejected Allison in part based on the Fifth Circuit’s pub-
lished denial of petition for rehearing in that case. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 68. 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
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ing back pay awards, the court held that class certification under 
23(b)(2) is not precluded where monetary relief is sought. The court 
then somewhat startlingly held that the mere allegation of a policy 
and practice of denying equal opportunities to women “is sufficient 
to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement.”69 The court therefore sev-
ered and certified claims regarding liability, injunctive relief, and 
classwide punitive damages, deferring a ruling on class treatment of 
individual damages.70 A similar approach was followed in Shores v. 
Publix Super Markets, Inc.71 There the court certified a class under 
Rule 23(b)(2) based on its finding that the class had already satisfied 
the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a). The court then bi-
furcated the trial into a first phase covering liability and a second 
phase covering damages. The court acknowledged that it had “not 
determined what means it will employ to efficiently resolve Stage II 
damages claims. Nor has it determined how punitive damages will be 
handled.”72 
At least one of these cases is consistent with the holding of Alli-
son despite coming out the opposite way on the facts. In Arnold v. 
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,73 the court certified a 23(b)(2) 
class alleging disability discrimination in movie theater access under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and California state law. 
The California statute allowed compensatory damages for each viola-
tion, and the court considered whether such damages predominated 
over the requested injunctive relief. Significantly, each plaintiff 
 
 69. Id. at 55. 
 70. The problems raised by bifurcated trials under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are dis-
cussed infra Part V.C. It should nonetheless be pointed out here that the Butler court’s inclu-
sion of “classwide” punitive damages in the phase-one determination may have been incorrect. 
Arguably, liability for punitive damages depends on individual circumstances. It cannot be im-
posed as a result of a classwide determination of pattern-and-practice liability, which does not 
purport to determine whether any single class member has been a victim of discrimination, 
much less whether each class member has been treated with “malice or with reckless indiffer-
ence to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual” as required to justify a puni-
tive award. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417–18 (5th Cir. 1998); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). The language of the 1991 Act seems to confirm this: the Act 
provides for punitive awards to “a complaining party,” not to a class as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). If a class and a “party” were the same thing, then the 
damages caps imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) would limit class recovery to $300,000 
because that limit caps recovery for a “party.” That clearly was not what Congress intended. 
 71. 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477 (M.D. Fla. 1996). 
 72. Id. ¶ 87,689. 
 73. 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
5PIA-FIN.DOC 2/22/01  8:07 PM 
305] The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions 
 323 
sought only the $250 statutory minimum damage award for each 
violation. Comparing such an award with cases in which back pay 
was permitted in 23(b)(2) class actions, and noting that 23(b)(2) 
was “specifically designed” for civil rights classes, the court con-
cluded that the action was maintainable as a 23(b)(2) class because 
the damages assessment would not require “a complicated, individ-
ual-specific calculus.”74 
As discussed below, the named plaintiffs’ forswearing of full 
money damages on behalf of a class raises important questions about 
the appropriateness of class certification that were not addressed in 
Arnold. Nonetheless, the Arnold decision is largely consistent with 
Allison and related cases. Because the amount of damages at issue 
was small, it is plausible to consider such damages as incidental to 
the more sweeping injunctive relief sought, which was the physical 
alteration of over seventy movie theaters to accommodate disabled 
patrons.75 Further, because the amount of damages was fixed as to 
each plaintiff, the determination of damages would be a mechanical 
matter once liability was established and would not require addi-
tional fact finding or the analysis of complex issues of law. 
7. Foregoing money damages—Zachery v. Texaco 
The complications introduced by money damages in 23(b)(2) 
cases could be avoided if class members simply did not seek money 
damages at all in disparate treatment cases.76 Such an attempt was re-
jected, however, in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Production, 
Inc.77 The plaintiffs in Zachery sought certification of a class of al-
leged victims of intentional and unintentional race discrimination in 
pay, promotions, and hiring. As part of their litigation strategy, the 
named plaintiffs dropped their claims for compensatory and punitive 
damages and sought 23(b)(2) certification.78 The court nonetheless 
denied class certification because of concerns that the unnamed 
plaintiffs might thereby be stripped involuntarily of their right to re-
cover damages. Central to this holding was the apparent unavailabil-
 
 74. Id. at 452. 
 75. See id. at 444, 445. 
 76. In a pure disparate impact case, only equitable relief is available, and damages are 
therefore not an issue. 
 77. 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999). 
 78. See id. at 242. 
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ity of an opt-out procedure under 23(b)(2). The Zachery court noted 
that the Supreme Court had raised this issue in Ticor Title Insurance 
Co. v. Brown79 but then had chosen not to decide it, meaning that 
there was “no clear cut decision” on the availability of an opt-out 
procedure in 23(b)(2) cases.80 This meant that should relief be 
granted to a 23(b)(2) class that excluded money damages it would 
be possible that no class member would be able to recover such 
damages because the entire class would necessarily be bound by the 
judgment. A plaintiffs’ victory in the class action might therefore 
stand as a bar to any subsequent actions by the class members to re-
cover the money damages that their representatives had forsworn.81 
Thus, the court concluded that the decision to drop monetary dam-
ages could not be “imposed upon the absent class members without 
raising a very serious conflict of interest” and refused to certify the 
class.82 
The Zachery decision encapsulates many of the problems inher-
ent in trying to reconcile the damages provisions of the 1991 Act 
with 23(b)(2) class certification. The individualized nature of such 
relief is at odds with the homogeneity of harm and remedy presup-
posed by 23(b)(2) certification. At the same time, attempts to forego 
such relief may be barred by the lack of an opt-out provision—a pro-
vision that is not part of 23(b)(2) precisely because of the common 
interests and remedies of the archetypal 23(b)(2) class. 
8. The end of the 23(b)(2) Title VII class? 
For all of these reasons, it would appear that the more persuasive 
authority has denied 23(b)(2) certification in Title VII class actions. 
Because the 23(b)(2) class is a homogeneous class as to which ho-
mogeneous relief can be granted, the presence of individualized 
claims seems incompatible with that type of action. Those cases that 
 
 79. 511 U.S. 117, 120–21 (1994). 
 80. See Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at 244 (citing Ticor Title Ins. Co., 511 U.S. at 120–21). 
 81. See id. at 243–44. 
 82. Id. at 244. Another court has characterized this problem as a “catch-22”: if the 
plaintiffs do not seek full relief, they could be accused of being inadequate class representatives. 
If they do seek full relief, then under Zachery they may fail to meet the 23(b)(2) requirements 
for certification. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 679 (E.D. Tex. 2000). The Smith 
court sidestepped this dilemma by certifying only the equitable claims under Rule 23(b)(2) 
with an opt-out provision and certifying the damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3). See infra 
Part V.C (discussing this type of split certification). 
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have nonetheless certified 23(b)(2) classes have done so in express or 
implicit reliance on pre-1991 cases and their treatment of equitable 
back pay relief—a type of relief that is generally less complex and less 
individualized than compensatory or punitive damages and which is 
therefore less at odds with the fundamental purposes of Rule 
23(b)(2). 
In addition to the incompatibility of individualized damages with 
the 23(b)(2) model, the apparent or arguable lack of an opt-out pro-
cedure for 23(b)(2) classes should preclude attempts to bind class 
members to the adjudication of their monetary claims in a 23(b)(2) 
case. Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which entitles potential class members to 
notice of the class action and the opportunity to “opt out” of the 
class to pursue their claims individually, Rule 23(b)(2) class actions 
bind all class members with or without their consent. This is consis-
tent with the homogeneity of harm and remedy contemplated by 
Rule 23(b)(2): if all class members are harmed in a similar way and if 
that harm can be remedied through the same declaratory or injunc-
tive relief, then it makes sense to apply that relief once to all class 
members rather than allowing individualized adjudication and risking 
inconsistent or inefficiently repetitive outcomes. Where damages 
claims are at issue, however, courts have been wary of the right to 
opt out as a matter of due process and have frequently looked to 
Rule 23(b)(3) rather than 23(b)(2) to address such claims.83 If the 
1991 remedies are a square peg, Rule 23(b)(2) is a round hole, and, 
as the two presently exist, they cannot be fitted without distorting 
them both. 
B. 23(b)(3) Classes—Commonality, Manageability, and Negative 
Value 
The certification of Title VII class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) 
has also become problematic in the wake of the 1991 Act’s damages 
provisions. In particular, the 1991 remedies have raised questions 
concerning commonality, manageability, and negative value in adju-
dicating 23(b)(3) certification. 
 
 83. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Jefferson v. Ingersoll 
Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999). See infra Part V.B. 
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1. Commonality 
A primary issue under Rule 23(b)(3) has been that of commonal-
ity: whether, when each plaintiff or class member seeks compensatory 
and punitive damages, “questions of law or fact common to the 
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members.”84 Under the 1991 Act, entitlement to compen-
satory and perhaps punitive damages will turn on each plaintiff’s pri-
vate experience of discrimination as well as on personal factors (such 
as psychiatric history, medical history, family situation, or other social 
particularities) that may influence the type or degree of emotional or 
other harm resulting from that discrimination. Accordingly, when 
such damages are sought, there is a strong possibility that questions 
affecting individual members will predominate, thereby precluding 
23(b)(3) certification. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that a claim for damages will not in-
evitably preclude 23(b)(3) certification. The Advisory Committee 
appears to have taken a balanced view of this issue, with an eye to-
ward promoting judicial efficiency. As the Committee explained, a 
primary purpose of the rule is the achievement of economies of scale 
for courts and litigants: 
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class 
action may be maintained under this subdivision [23(b)(3)], that 
the questions common to the class predominate over the questions 
affecting individual members. It is only where this predominance 
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action 
device.85 
Thus, the presence of individual damages claims would not nec-
essarily bar 23(b)(3) certification, so long as the resulting class was 
an efficient collective means of disposing of those claims. The Com-
mittee continued: 
In this view, a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of 
similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class 
 
 84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). This requirement of “commonality” under Rule 23(b)(3) 
should not be confused with the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a), which asks 
whether there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” The 23(a) “commonality” 
standard has generally been viewed as less rigorous than the one in Rule 23(b)(3). See Gorence 
v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 93 C 4862, 1994 WL 445149 at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 
1994). 
 85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). 
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action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, 
for separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals 
within the class. On the other hand, although having some com-
mon core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class ac-
tion if there was material variation in the representations made or in  
the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were 
addressed.86 
The availability of Rule 23(b)(3) certification will therefore turn 
less on the mere availability of money damages than on the possibil-
ity of achieving efficiency by the adjudication of common damages 
claims through use of the class device. 
Courts confronting the 23(b)(3) commonality issue following 
the 1991 Act have reached mixed results. Here, too, Allison provides 
the only direct appellate authority to date under Title VII. The Alli-
son court rejected 23(b)(3) certification of the class before it, holding 
that the individual-specific damages issues raised by the plaintiffs 
meant that a class action would likely degenerate into “multiple law-
suits separately tried.” 
The plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory and punitive damages must 
therefore focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific to indi-
viduals rather than the class as a whole: what kind of discrimination 
was each plaintiff subjected to; how did it affect each plaintiff emo-
tionally and physically, at work and at home; what medical treat-
ment did each plaintiff receive and at what expense; and so on and 
so on. Under such circumstances, an action conducted nominally as 
a class action would “degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits 
separately tried.”87 
The Eleventh Circuit has also rejected 23(b)(3) certification in a 
discrimination case, Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.88 
While Rutstein is not an employment discrimination case, it would 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes)). The Seventh Circuit, in Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, 
Inc., appeared to hint that 23(b)(3) certification could be appropriate in Title VII class actions 
precisely because of the availability of money damages, which made 23(b)(3) a more suitable 
choice than 23(b)(2) due to the opt-out provision. 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). The 
Seventh Circuit directed the district court on remand to consider 23(b)(3) certification as one 
possibility but stated in the same breath that it “did not broach” the question whether 
23(b)(3) certification was “sound” in the case before it. Id. at 899. 
 88. 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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seem to leave little room for 23(b)(3) certification in any discrimina-
tion case in which individualized damages are sought. 
The plaintiffs in Rutstein sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging 
that Avis followed a “Yeshiva policy” designed to deny services to 
individuals and businesses with Jewish-sounding accents or Jewish-
sounding names. The district court certified the case as a 23(b)(3) 
class action, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed based both on the 
elements of proof and the damages sought. As to proof, the court 
noted that each plaintiff, in order to prevail, would have to prove 
that he or she was intentionally discriminated against by the defen-
dant. Thus, “[e]ach plaintiff will have to bring forth evidence dem-
onstrating that the defendant had an intent to treat him or her less 
favorably because of the plaintiff’s Jewish ethnicity.”89 Likewise, the 
fact that each plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages 
made the case inappropriate for class treatment. 
To establish that they are entitled to some compensation, plaintiffs 
will have to prove that they actually suffered some injury, whether 
it be emotional or otherwise. The idea that individual injury could 
be settled on a classwide basis is preposterous. Plaintiffs’ claims for 
damages must “focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific to 
individuals rather than the class as a whole: what kind of discrimi-
nation was each plaintiff subjected to[, and] how did it affect each 
plaintiff emotionally and physically, at work and at home.”90 
This requirement meant that “most, if not all, of the plaintiffs’ 
claims will stand or fall, not on the answer to the question whether 
[Avis] has a practice or policy of [ethnic] discrimination, but on the 
resolution of . . . highly case-specific factual issues.”91 This also made 
Teamsters-style adjudication inappropriate because “the establish-
ment of a policy or practice of discrimination cannot trigger the de-
fendant’s liability for damages to all the plaintiffs in the putative 
class,”92 which would still require individual determinations. 
While the Rutstein court was careful to point out that “[t]his is 
not a case alleging employment discrimination,” its holding would 
 
 89. Id. at 1235. 
 90. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 419). 
 91. Id. at 1234 (quoting Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 
(11th Cir. 1997) (decertifying class alleging discrimination in lodging where liability to class 
members would turn on individualized circumstances of denial of motel rooms to each class 
member)). 
 92. Id. at 1239. 
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seem to leave little room for the certification of any class—including 
a Title VII class—in which the plaintiffs or potential class members 
seek individualized damages.93 
Some district courts have likewise rejected 23(b)(3) certification 
in Title VII cases on grounds of lack of commonality. In Adams v. 
Henderson, the court held that the presence of individual damages 
claims would require “individualized liability inquiries,” thereby 
making it unsuitable for 23(b)(3) certification.94 The court in Zapata 
v. IBP, Inc. denied such certification, noting that “claims for com-
pensatory damages . . . greatly complicate the management of a 
class” and that the assessment of psychological damages “would nec-
essarily require an individual, subjective analysis.”95 The court in Gor-
ence v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc. noted that the assessment of dis-
crimination and “individualized damages” would require it to “hold 
a series of mini-trials” and denied 23(b)(3) certification.96 And in 
Faulk v. Home Oil Co., the court adopted the reasoning of the Alli-
son court to deny 23(b)(3) certification to a potential class of race 
discriminatees.97 
By contrast, in Griffin v. Home Depot, Inc., the court denied a 
motion to dismiss the class allegations in a sex discrimination com-
plaint, holding that on the pleadings “one can postulate that there is 
sufficient commonality of facts to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).”98 This 
amounts to a holding that 23(b)(3) certification is not automatically 
precluded in Title VII class actions—a holding not at odds with the 
Advisory Committee’s view of damages in 23(b)(3) cases but per-
haps inconsistent with Allison’s recognition that damages determina-
tions arising out of employment discrimination tend, by definition, 
to be more individualized than typical. 
2. Manageability 
Hand-in-hand with the issue of commonality under Rule 
23(b)(3) has gone the issue of manageability. One factor for consid-
eration under Rule 23(b)(3) is “the difficulties likely to be encoun-
 
 93. See id. at 1241. 
 94. 197 F.R.D. 162, 172 (D. Md. 2000). 
 95. 167 F.R.D. 147, 163 (D. Kan. 1996). 
 96. No. 93 C 4862, 1994 WL 445149 at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1994). 
 97. 184 F.R.D. 645, 661–62 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 98. 168 F.R.D. 187, 191 (E.D. La. 1996). 
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tered in the management of a class action.”99 In the Title VII con-
text, this has for the most part meant the logistical difficulties atten-
dant to trying the individualized damages claims of hundreds or even 
thousands of class members. The Allison court sketched the problem 
concisely: “[T]his action must be tried to a jury and involves more 
than a thousand potential plaintiffs spread across two separate facili-
ties, represented by six different unions, working in seven different 
departments, and alleging discrimination over a period of nearly 
twenty years.”100 While each party is entitled to trial by jury in such 
cases, it is unthinkable that a single jury could try this or even a 
much smaller class action in which individual issues must be resolved 
as to each plaintiff. Accordingly, courts in a variety of settings have 
rejected the class device where the need for individual jury fact find-
ing would render class adjudication unmanageable.101 At least one 
court, on the other hand, has expressed a preference for class adjudi-
cation over individual adjudication in the Title VII context. In Smith 
v. Texaco, Inc.,102 the court certified a 23(b)(3) class of approximately 
200 employees alleging race discrimination in employment. In doing 
so, the court noted that, should the claims be tried individually, “this 
one district court will be totally and fully occupied for the larger part 
of at least 200 weeks in the trial of these claims alone.”103 The court 
therefore concluded that “individual actions would take up far more 
judicial resources than a single class[,] . . . [and] a class action is a 
superior means for managing this case because of the efficiencies in-
volved in addressing the claims of about 200 class persons.”104 
The distinction drawn by the Smith court between class and indi-
vidual adjudication may be more rhetorical than actual: it is neither 
obvious nor inevitable that the litigation of hundreds or thousands of 
individual damages claims in a class action will be less time consum-
ing than whatever individual lawsuits might be brought if class certi-
 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
 100. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 101. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that it is 
proper to deny certification in securities fraud case due to “excessive managerial burden” im-
posed by individualized issues of knowledge and reliance); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 
573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding denial of certification in antitrust case where, 
inter alia, certification might bring in “thousands of possible claimants,” leading to a “multi-
tude of mini-trials”). 
 102. 88 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2000). 
 103. Id. at 682. 
 104. Id. at 683. 
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fication were denied. In either scenario, individualized, jury-based 
fact finding must be undertaken as to each plaintiff or class member 
who seeks to recover compensatory or punitive damages. Left to 
their own devices, however, some members of a large group of indi-
vidual plaintiffs might lose interest in pressing their claims, realize 
that they did not have claims and so not bring them, or be unable to 
find counsel to represent them should their case not be sufficiently 
strong. Accordingly, the denial of a certification to a class of two 
hundred members does not mean that two hundred individual law-
suits would be brought. This makes the rationale of the Smith court 
less persuasive than it might first appear. 
3. Negative value 
Finally, the damages afforded by the 1991 Act have diminished 
the force of another strong rationale for granting 23(b)(3) certifica-
tion: the specter of the negative value lawsuit. One benefit of the 
class action device is that it permits plaintiffs to aggregate small 
claims. Although such claims individually may be worth less than the 
cost of litigation, when combined as a class they may be worth the 
efforts of an attorney, which grants the plaintiffs access to the courts 
that they might not otherwise have. In certifying 23(b)(3) classes in 
various settings, courts have sometimes relied on the fact that a de-
nial of certification could effectively bar the bringing of such small-
value individual claims. The danger of negative value suits has even 
been described as “[t]he most compelling rationale”105 for granting 
23(b)(3) certification in an appropriate case. The 1991 Act, how-
ever, has effectively removed this issue from the Title VII arena. 
Given the significant statutory damages available under the 1991 Act 
(ranging from $50,000 to $300,000 per plaintiff, depending on the 
size of the employer), as well as the availability of attorney’s fees to 
the prevailing party,106 the possibility of negative value suits is now 
virtually nonexistent in Title VII cases.107 
 
 
 105. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (1994). 
 107. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The 
relatively substantial value of these claims (for the statutory maximum of $300,000 per plain-
tiff) and the availability of attorney’s fees eliminate financial barriers that might make individual 
lawsuits unlikely or infeasible.”). 
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C. Procedural and Constitutional Problems of Bifurcation and Partial 
Certification 
Courts have attempted to circumvent Rule 23 concerns by apply-
ing various schemes of bifurcation or partial certification to Title VII 
classes after the 1991 Act. The most frequent scheme of this type is 
the certification of liability determinations and equitable relief under 
Rule 23(b)(2), with the court reserving judgment on how to handle 
damages claims or ordering their certification separately under Rule 
23(b)(3).108 Another option, and one raised by the plaintiffs in Alli-
son, is to certify a class only as to the disparate impact claims, leaving 
the disparate treatment claims for individual trials or later class 
treatment.109 Such schemes, however, pose serious problems under 
Rule 23 and the Seventh Amendment. In many cases, these difficul-
ties have been ignored or minimized by the courts, and one suspects 
that in some cases courts are either unable or unwilling to confront 
the profound changes wrought in the class action landscape by the 
1991 Act. 
1. Procedural issues 
Much of the current judicial approach to Title VII class actions 
has evolved from the class action management scheme approved in 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States 110 and dis-
cussed above. The difficulties with such bifurcated proceedings un-
der the 1991 Act are both procedural and constitutional: procedural 
because of concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s commonality require-
ment and the misuse of Rule 23(c)(4) to evade that requirement and 
constitutional because of concerns about the Seventh Amendment 
rights of the parties in cases that could employ scores or even hun-
dreds of juries under some circumstances. 
The Teamsters paradigm was both sensible and effective when 
only equitable remedies were available. It allowed for focused resolu-
tion of the dominant equitable issues, and, while individual relief 
could be time consuming to administer, at least it was not compli-
cated by individualized damages issues. The paradigm also worked 
 
 108. See, e.g., Smith v. Texaco Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 667, 682 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Shores v. 
Publix, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., 
70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 109. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 422. 
 110. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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when neither party had the right to a jury trial, as special masters 
could be used to streamline the proceedings in the damages phase. 
This paradigm appears to have become ingrained in the psyches of 
many litigants and judges, but its application is questionable in the 
wake of the 1991 Act. 
The Fifth Circuit faced these issues squarely in Allison and re-
jected (though not categorically) the use of bifurcated or partial class 
proceedings in Title VII class actions. The Allison plaintiffs first sug-
gested certifying all damages issues under Rule 23(b)(3) and the rest 
of the case under Rule 23(b)(2). This suggestion was rejected based 
on the Fifth Circuit’s 23(b)(3) “commonality” analysis. The court 
noted that the case before it involved over one thousand potential 
class members at two facilities, represented by six unions, in seven 
departments, over a twenty-year period. Each of these thousand 
claimants sought compensatory and punitive damages, which would 
require individualized determination. The court therefore concluded 
that Rule 23(b)(3) certification would be inappropriate in light of 
this lack of commonality. The court also noted that the availability to 
each plaintiff of attorney’s fees and up to $300,000 in damages 
eliminated the possibility of a “negative value suit,” one of the most 
frequent rationales for certifying a 23(b)(3) class.111 Thus, because 
23(b)(3) certification was inappropriate, the attempt to “split” certi-
fication between Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) was also improper. 112 
The Allison plaintiffs suggested a second bifurcation scheme: cer-
tifying both their disparate impact and pattern-and-practice claims 
under Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3), trying those issues to a jury, and 
allowing the court to rule on the certification of the remaining 
claims—such as those for damages—after the jury’s findings on these 
initial issues.113 The court rejected this proposal as well, stating that 
 
 111. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 419–20 (quoting Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 
F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996)). The court also noted that multiple juries would be needed to 
try the thousand or so damages claims, thereby raising Seventh Amendment issues. See infra 
Part V.C.3. 
 112. The Seventh Circuit in Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 
1999), suggested, without deciding, that classes of this type could be handled by certifying the 
injunctive aspects under Rule 23(b)(2) and the damages aspects under Rule 23(b)(3). This 
suggestion was made as part of the court’s discussion of how courts might preserve what it 
viewed as essential opt-out rights where money damages are sought. See id. The court also 
noted, however, that it expressed no view on whether Rule 23(b)(3) certification would be 
proper in Title VII class actions, which it would have to be for such a scheme to work. See id. 
at 899. 
 113. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 420–21. 
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there was no reason to believe that adjudication of the first phase—
the pattern-and-practice and disparate impact issues—would make 
possible the class certification of damages issues in the second phase 
in light of its previous determination that the damages issues were 
uncertifiable because of their individualized nature. Noting that un-
der Teamsters there are no common issues between a first-stage pat-
tern and practice finding of liability (which merely creates a rebut-
table presumption of discrimination against affected individuals) and 
the second remedial phase (which requires individuals to prove that 
the presumption should apply to them and that they suffered dam-
ages),114 the court declined to certify the initial phase of the litigation 
“when there is no foreseeable likelihood that the claims for compen-
satory and punitive damages could be certified in the class action 
sought by the plaintiffs.”115 
The court pointed out that what the plaintiffs were suggesting 
was an end run around the commonality requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3): by temporarily setting aside individual-specific damages is-
sues (presumably by invoking Rule 23(c)(4)),116 the plaintiffs could 
pretend for purposes of the first phase that common issues, rather 
than individual-specific issues, would predominate for purposes of 
23(b)(3) certification. The Allison court refused to indulge this 
make-believe commonality based on Fifth Circuit precedent, which 
forbids attempts to “manufacture predominance through the nimble 
use of subdivision (c)(4).”117 Otherwise, a court in any case could 
sever issues until only common issues remained, and “the result 
would be automatic certification in every case where there is a com-
mon issue, a result that could not have been intended.”118 
Other courts have not been so scrupulous. In Butler v. Home 
Depot, for instance, the court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) as 
to “liability and relief applicable to the class as a whole including de-
claratory and injunctive relief, and whether defendant is liable for 
punitive damages.”119 The court admitted, however, that it had not 
 
 114. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 877–80 (1984). 
 115. Allison, 151 F.3d at 421. 
 116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4), which provides that “[w]hen appropriate . . . an ac-
tion may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” 
 117. Allison, 151 F.3d at 422 (quoting Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 
745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1996 WL 421436 at *1 (N.D. 
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determined how to handle the phase-two damages determinations: 
“The precise procedures to be used during the second phase, if any, 
will be determined later in this litigation.”120 Similarly, in Shores v. 
Publix the court approved a “hybrid” class, relying on pre-1991 
Eleventh Circuit precedent.121 In the first phase, liability would be 
resolved under Rule 23(b)(2), while in the second phase, damages 
would be determined under a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out procedure. Like 
the Butler court, the Shores court admitted that it “has not deter-
mined what means it will employ to efficiently resolve Stage II 
claims. Nor has it determined how claims for punitive damages will 
be handled.”122 
It is remarkable that at least these two courts have certified bifur-
cated Title VII classes while frankly acknowledging that they have no 
idea how to handle the damages issues. This may reflect a habit of 
Teamsters-style adjudication in Title VII class cases that has pre-
vented some courts from grasping the implications of the 1991 Act. 
On a darker view, it may reflect a desire to set the class process in 
motion and force a settlement before thorny and time-consuming 
issues such as individual damages have to be addressed. In both But-
ler and Shores, the result of certification was an expensive settlement, 
and hence the strategy (if there was one) was successful. 
2. The integrity of Rule 23 
There are other sound reasons to prefer individual suits to class 
actions that would, in any event, degenerate into individual suits. In-
dividual suits preserve the integrity of Rule 23 by not stretching it to 
cover classes that lack the required commonality and manageability. 
They also avoid the danger that sweeping issues of liability may turn 
on the whims of a single jury. In a bifurcated class action, one jury 
will decide the existence of a pattern and practice of discrimination. 
 
Cal. Jan. 25, 1996). As noted above, the Butler court’s apparent belief that there is such a 
thing as “classwide” punitive damages may be incorrect. 
 120. Id. The parties never reached this issue: in September 1997 the case was settled for 
$65 million. See Home Depot Agrees to Pay $65 Million to Settle Sex Discrimination Class Ac-
tion, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Sept. 22, 1997, at A-11. 
 121. 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,477, 87,688 (citing Cox v. American Cast Iron 
Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
 122. Shores v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477, 
87,689 (M.D. Fla. 1996). As in Butler, the court never got that far. The case was settled in 
January 1997 for a total of $81.5 million. See Publix Markets Agrees to Pay $81.5 Million to 
Settle Sex Bias Suit, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Jan. 27, 1997, at AA-1. 
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If that jury decides against the employer, it then establishes a pre-
sumption of discrimination that applies to every member of the class 
who can prove an adverse job action in the individual adjudication 
phase. While the presumption is rebuttable, that presumption will 
have significantly heightened the burden on the employer and will 
increase the chance that it will be found liable to each of the individ-
ual plaintiffs. Depending on the size of the employer and the size of 
the class, a significant step will then have been taken toward the em-
ployer’s being found liable for millions upon millions of dollars in 
individual liability (in Allison, up to $300 million).123 Spreading this 
risk among multiple juries in individual cases will ensure that such 
momentous issues of liability are determined by a process involving 
the collective judgment of many juries, not the potential caprice of 
one. 
Courts in other contexts have recognized the value of nonclass, 
case-by-case adjudication of matters that threaten defendants with 
massive liability. In Matter of Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer, Inc.,124 the Sev-
enth Circuit held that a case involving potentially bankrupting liabil-
ity for manufacturers of antihemophiliac factor concentrate was un-
suitable for class treatment, in part because trying the case as a class 
action would place the fate of the industry in the hands of six people: 
[I]f these [individual] trials are permitted to go forward . . . the 
pattern that results will reflect a consensus, or at least a pooling of 
judgment, of many different tribunals. 
For this consensus or maturing of judgment the district judge pro-
poses to substitute a single trial before a single jury . . . . One 
jury . . . will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its 
hand . . . . [This] need not be tolerated when the alternative exists 
of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting in the aggre-
gate a much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers. 
That would not be a feasible option if the stakes to each class 
 
 123. Further, this risk is one-sided: should the phase-one jury rule against the plaintiffs, 
that decision has no res judicata effect as to the class members’ individual claims of discrimina-
tion because all that the decision means is that the employer does not discriminate against em-
ployees as a matter of standard practice. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 
877–80 (1984). Each class member remains free to file his own lawsuit (if timely), and the 
employer may gain little peace of mind by prevailing in this phase of the class action. In es-
sence, the plaintiffs have two chances instead of one to press their claims, and they and their 
lawyers have little incentive not to “shoot the moon” in seeking class certification. 
 124. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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member were too slight to repay the cost of suit, even though the 
aggregate stakes were very large and would repay the costs of a 
consolidated proceeding. But this is not the case . . . .125 
A case like Allison is not so different from a case like Rhone-
Poulenc. The total exposure in money damages alone in Allison was 
$300 million ($300,000 per class member times 1,000 potential 
members). It is a frightening prospect to place a small handful of ju-
rors in charge of such potentially crippling liability, especially where 
there are sound reasons why such a thing would be a misuse of Rule 
23. For this reason, the possibility of individual lawsuits rather then 
implausible Teamsters-style classes is to be preferred (or at least not 
bemoaned): plaintiffs who have colorable claims (and some who do 
not) will still get their day in court because their suits are potentially 
valuable, the judicial system will not necessarily be substantially more 
burdened, and defendants can have their potential liability deter-
mined by something more than a single set of jurors. 
3. Constitutional issues 
The issues raised by bifurcating class actions after 1991 are not 
only procedural but also constitutional. In a further effort to have 
their class certified, the Allison plaintiffs proposed certifying only 
their disparate impact claim, as to which money damages are not 
available, as a means of sidestepping the problems posed by their 
seeking individualized damages under their disparate treatment 
claim. While such a proposal presents far fewer Rule 23 problems 
than other attempts at certification, the availability of a jury trial un-
der the 1991 Act also implicates the Seventh Amendment. This diffi-
culty, the Allison court found, was insurmountable. 
As the Allison court explained, the Seventh Amendment pre-
serves the right to trial by jury in “suits at common law” where legal 
rights are to be determined.126 Where the right to a jury exists, the 
Seventh Amendment prohibits the reexamination of one jury’s find-
ings by another fact finder.127 Although a disparate impact claim does 
not implicate legal rights (the remedy being confined to equitable 
relief), the jury trial right conferred by the 1991 Act extends to “all 
 
 125. Id. at 1299–1300, quoted with approval in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 
F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 127. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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factual issues necessary to determine liability” and damages under the 
companion disparate treatment claim.128 Thus, where disparate im-
pact and disparate treatment claims are joined (as they were in Alli-
son), “the Seventh Amendment requires that all factual issues com-
mon to these claims be submitted to a jury for decision on the legal 
claims before final court determination of the equitable claims.”129 
The Allison court held that the certification of only the disparate 
impact claims would be barred by the Seventh Amendment because 
of the risk that subsequent fact finders in the disparate treatment liti-
gation would be required to revisit the first jury’s determinations 
both in determining liability toward individual plaintiffs and in de-
termining their damages. This problem is a function of the particular 
nature of proof in Title VII cases. In a disparate impact case, the 
plaintiffs must first produce evidence that a challenged policy or 
practice of the employer adversely affects a protected group. The 
employer may rebut this evidence by showing “that the challenged 
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.”130 In a class disparate treatment case, the plain-
tiffs must first show prima facie that discrimination is the employer’s 
standard practice, a showing that can be made by a combination of 
statistical and anecdotal evidence.131 The employer then can attempt 
to rebut this evidence, in the course of which it would almost inevi-
tably attempt to show that the actions that are the subject of the 
plaintiffs’ illustrative anecdotes were taken for legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons. 
These methods of proof provide considerable potential for over-
lap between the fact finding in a disparate impact case and the fact 
finding in a disparate treatment case, especially where the same em-
ployer practices and policies are challenged under both theories of 
liability. As the Allison court explained: 
It is the rare case indeed in which a challenged practice is job-
related and a business necessity, yet not a legitimate nondiscrimina-
tory reason for an adverse employment action taken pursuant to 
that practice. Thus, a finding that a challenged practice is job re-
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994). 
 131. See Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338–41 (1977); EEOC v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
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lated and a business necessity in response to a disparate impact 
claim strongly, if not wholly, implicates a finding that the same 
practice is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s 
actions in a pattern or practice claim.132 
Under the Title VII scheme of proof, then, “significant overlap 
of factual issues is almost inevitable whenever disparate impact and 
pattern or practice claims are joined in the same [class] action.”133 
Because consideration of these overlapping issues by different juries 
would violate the Seventh Amendment, the Allison court declined to 
certify the class only as to disparate impact.134 
Other courts have certified bifurcated classes in spite of these 
Seventh Amendment problems. Some courts have done so with little 
analysis, brushing aside the Seventh Amendment issues by declaring 
that the first- and second-phase determinations are legally distinct. 
For instance, in Butler v. Home Depot, the court certified a class un-
der Rule 23(b)(2) as to “liability and relief applicable to the class as a 
whole, including declaratory and injunctive relief, and whether de-
fendant is liable for punitive damages.”135 If liability were established, 
the second phase would decide “individual compensatory dam-
ages.”136 The only aspect of divided certification addressed by the 
court was the Seventh Amendment issue, which it disposed of by ob-
serving (based largely on pre-1991 cases) that courts have “rou-
tinely” adopted such a bifurcated approach. According to the Butler 
court, the mere fact that the second phase would involve “individual 
claims” meant that it would not involve the same issues as the first 
 
 132. Allison, 151 F.3d at 424. 
 133. Id. (citing Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1268–70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 134. For another discussion of these Seventh Amendment issues, see Keith R. Fentonmil-
ler, Damages, Jury Trials and the Class Action under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 12 LAB. L. 
421, 437–47 (1997). Had the Allison plaintiffs not joined disparate impact and disparate 
treatment claims in the same case, this issue would not have been present. It appears to be an 
open question what would happen if a class sued on a disparate impact theory and then tried to 
bring a separate disparate treatment case under the same facts. Most likely, the same Seventh 
Amendment issues would arise because there would still be factual overlap between these 
claims, whether or not they were joined. It is doubtful that a class disparate impact claim could 
be tried to judgment before the statute of limitations expired on disparate treatment claims 
under the same facts (unless the plaintiffs could rely on a theory of continuing violation); thus, 
the possibility of consecutive disparate impact and disparate treatment suits involving the same 
facts would seem remote. 
 135. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI 1996 WL 421436, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 25, 1996). 
 136. Id. at *6. 
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phase would.137 The court did not, however, analyze the methods of 
proof under Title VII to the degree that Allison did and thus may 
not have considered the matter as thoroughly. In EEOC v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp.,138 a class action under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, the court rejected Seventh Amendment concerns 
much as the Butler court did. Noting that the phase-one finding of 
liability did no more than establish a presumption of discrimination, 
the court held that phase-two issues of individual liability were there-
fore “separate and distinct” issues of fact.139 As in Butler, the court 
did not address the details of the ADEA’s proof scheme, which mir-
rors that of Title VII,140 in making this holding. 
Decisions like these appear questionable (or at least hasty) in 
light of the 1991 Act and the concerns raised by Allison. The 
McDonnell Douglas court undermined its own holding when it noted 
the various means of proof that an employer could use to rebut the 
plaintiffs’ phase-one case: 
Although the Defendant will not be able to present evidence re-
garding each individual termination at the liability trial, it can “in-
troduce direct statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, illustrative 
evidence of individual dismissals and any other evidence that bears 
on the issue of whether a pattern of discrimination existed.”141 
This begs the question, however: if an employer introduces an-
ecdotal evidence or “illustrative evidence of individual dismissals,” 
then presumably, in determining the existence of a pattern of dis-
crimination, a jury may find that there was discrimination behind 
those events. In the second phase, when the liability to the particular 
employees who were involved in these events is adjudicated, the li-
ability jury would be free to decide that there was no discrimination 
present, thereby discounting evidence that the first jury found dispo-
sitive. Thus, while the questions of pattern and practice and individ-
ual liability are indeed separate issues in the sense that the answer to 
the first question (did the employer discriminate as a matter of prac-
tice?) does not resolve the second (was this particular class member 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. 960 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 139. See id. at 205. 
 140. Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n., Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 141. EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996) 
(quoting Sperling v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D.N.J. 1996)). 
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discriminated against?), the scheme of proof in employment dis-
crimination cases raises the risk that different juries may make differ-
ent findings based on the same facts—a situation that is prohibited 
under the Seventh Amendment. 
It may be that the Seventh Amendment problems in Allison were 
simply ones of scale. The court appears to have assumed that multi-
ple juries would be needed to resolve the individual claims—a safe 
assumption in a class covering one thousand potential members. It is 
conceivable, however, that a Title VII class could be small enough to 
have all of its claims heard by a single jury. Rule 23 requires no 
minimum number of class members for certification, and Rule 23 
classes have been certified with as few as thirteen members.142 While 
a small class may not solve the problems of predominance and com-
monality, it would at least avoid Seventh Amendment problems by 
making it possible to use a single fact finder throughout. 
4. The Allison denial of rehearing 
As a coda to the bifurcation issues raised by Allison, it is worth 
examining the court’s somewhat cryptic denial of rehearing. The 
logic of Allison would seem to preclude most types of divided or par-
tial certifications, but the Allison court apparently did not intend to 
prohibit such schemes absolutely. In denying rehearing, the court 
acknowledged that some forms of partial certification might survive. 
The trial court utilized consolidation under rule 42 rather than 
class certification under Rule 23 to manage this case . . . . We are 
not called upon to decide whether the district court would have 
abused its discretion if it had elected to bifurcate liability issues that 
are common to the class and to certify for class determination those 
discreet liability issues.143 
 
 142. See, e.g., Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534–35 (D.N.H. 
1971) (certifying class of thirteen members in patent infringement case); Cypress v. Newport 
News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass’n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967) (certifying class 
of eighteen minority physicians in race discrimination case). 
 143. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 434 (5th Cir. 1998). The trial 
court explained: “[I]n some instances it may be appropriate to consolidate cases with similar 
facts and issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. However, it will be necessary for the unnamed 
potential class members to file their own lawsuits rather than intervene in the present action.” 
Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 165 F.R.D. 463, 471 (W.D. La. 1995). Examples of such 
consolidation might be trying simultaneously all promotion claims involving the same deci-
sionmaker or all claims of discriminatory discipline involving the same supervisor and the same 
employee conduct. 
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This has the ring of a declaration that will become famously puz-
zled over in the years ahead. Some courts have taken it to undermine 
the main opinion’s holdings entirely, reducing them to dicta.144 
Others have read it more narrowly as an acknowledgment that the 
principles discussed in the main opinion are not absolute.145 The lat-
ter view appears more likely: had the Fifth Circuit wanted to nullify 
large portions of its opinion, it could simply have withdrawn them. 
Moreover, its holdings concerning the nature of Rule 23 were not 
dicta because the decision appealed from was a denial of Rule 23 cer-
tification. And the Fifth Circuit itself relied on Allison as precedent 
in a later case, following Allison’s holdings as to Rule 23(b)(2) pre-
dominance in reversing certification of a class under the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act.146 
Yet, if nullification is not what the statement means, determining 
what it does mean is still challenging. One possibility is that liability 
issues could be certified as “stand-alone” class claims only to the ex-
tent that they do not implicate the manageability and Seventh 
Amendment concerns addressed in the main opinion. But such “li-
ability issues” virtually by definition (according to the Allison court) 
could not be issues that shared any facts in common with the deter-
mination of compensatory or punitive damages because of the con-
straints of Rule 23 and the Seventh Amendment. Thus, such issues 
would have to be either damages issues that were not individualized, 
such as liquidated damages claims, or equitable issues that did not 
implicate fact issues that could arise in evaluating the disparate 
treatment claims of the individual plaintiffs. Such claims, if they exist, 
would therefore be very narrow indeed. One possible example would 
be claims for relief from specific policies and procedures that were 
challenged only on a disparate impact theory. For these sorts of 
claims, damages would not be available, the facts necessary to prove 
such a claim would not be at issue in any individual’s disparate 
treatment case (because there would be no such cases), and certifica-
tion as to that discreet issue could proceed. Thus, the Allison plain-
tiffs may have hampered themselves by the breadth of their chal-
lenge: if class status is the goal, then Allison suggests that a narrower 
 
 144. See, e.g., Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 145. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Faulk 
v. Home Oil Co., 184 F.R.D. 645, 660–61 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Riley v. Compucom Sys., Inc., 
No. CIV. A398CV1876L, 2000 WL 343189, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Tex. March 31, 2000). 
 146. See Washington v. CSC Credit Servs., 199 F.3d 263, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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focus may be a more sure road to success and a pure disparate impact 
case the safest route of all. 
D. The Problem of the Blackmail Class 
A final problem introduced by the 1991 Act is the problem of 
the blackmail class—the risk that the monetary exposure presented 
by the availability of compensatory and punitive damages to each 
class member will force defendants to settle regardless of any wrong-
doing. The plaintiffs in Allison tried overtly to exploit this issue, ar-
guing on appeal that partial certification would “facilitate” settle-
ment. The Allison court rejected that argument: “[W]e should not 
condone a certification-at-all-costs approach to this case for the sim-
ple purpose of forcing a settlement. Settlements should reflect the 
relative merits of the parties’ claims, not a surrender to the vagaries 
of an utterly unpredictable and burdensome litigation procedure.”147 
These are laudable goals, but they are routinely trampled on in class 
litigation. Class actions are frequently settled for reasons having 
nothing to do with their merits: faced with potentially overwhelming 
liability, bad publicity, and enormous legal fees (even if it prevails), 
an employer may capitulate and settle the case even though it may 
lack merit and even though it ultimately may not be maintainable as 
a class action.148 Nor are plaintiffs’ lawyers shy about this goal. In the 
author’s own experience, class plaintiffs’ lawyers have been heard pri-
vately to say that their goal is to bankrupt the defendant or, more 
colorfully, to “blow them off the New York Stock Exchange.” This 
approach has been recognized in class cases as the principle of “judi-
cial blackmail.”149 While liability in Title VII cases does not always 
rise to the potentially crippling liability present in mass tort litigation, 
 
 147. Allison, 151 F.3d at 422 n.17. 
 148. As noted above, this problem is illustrated starkly by cases such as Shores v. Publix 
Super Markets, Inc., 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477 (M.D. Fla. 1996), and Butler v. 
Home Depot, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996), in which courts certi-
fied portions of class actions while acknowledging that they did not know how to manage the 
remainder of the case. The class process with all of its risk and expense was set in motion; yet, 
it was by no means clear that the use of the class device was proper under the circumstances. 
 149. As the Rutstein court stated: “[T]here is nothing to be gained by certifying this case 
as a class action . . . except the blackmail value of a class certification that can aid the plaintiffs 
in coercing the defendant into a settlement.” Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 
1228, 1240 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000). See also In Re Matter of Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer, Inc., 51 
F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th 
Cir. 1996). 
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the $300 million at stake in Allison is momentous, and, for any given 
employer, the prospect of a multimillion dollar legal bill or a nine-
figure damages exposure is surely an incentive to settle regardless of 
the merits of the claims.150 Indeed, settlements of class actions for 
millions, tens of millions, or hundreds of millions of dollars are be-
coming increasingly common151 and are increasingly accompanied by 
employers’ public statements that it was less expensive to settle the 
case than to litigate it with the attendant risks.152 Careful attention to 
the requirements of Rule 23 and the Seventh Amendment is there-
fore desirable to police the class action scene and to protect against 
abuses of class proceedings by plaintiffs and their lawyers. 
VI. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 
Nearly ten years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
its implications are just beginning to be felt in the area of Title VII 
class actions. While many lower courts have shown themselves will-
ing to ignore or able to work around these implications, there is 
every indication that as more of these cases reach the appellate level 
more and more courts may adopt the kinds of restrictions recognized 
in Allison. Thus, there is a real possibility that a law that was passed 
in order to expand the relief available to individual victims of dis-
 
 150. While it is probably impossible to quantify how many settled class actions have merit 
and how many do not, statistics concerning individual discrimination suits may be informative. 
Of the discrimination charges submitted to the mandatory pre-lawsuit administrative proce-
dure before the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency in 
fiscal 1999 found probable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred in only 5.7% of 
charges. That was the highest rate in the last eight years, and “cause” findings have historically 
been as low as 1.6%. See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Changes FY 1992 – FY 1999 (visited Oct. 27, 2000) 
<http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html>. Of the employment discrimination lawsuits disposed 
of in federal court from October 1, 1998, through September 30, 1999, (both class actions 
and non-class actions) approximately 80% were dismissed by the courts before trial, while only 
5.8% were eventually tried. It is difficult to escape an inference that a huge number of meritless 
cases are being brought, and there is no apparent reason why class actions should be any excep-
tion to the general rule. 
 151. In the author’s city of Atlanta, for example, the past two years have brought the fil-
ing of race discrimination class actions against the Coca-Cola Company (twice), Lockheed 
Martin Corporation (one suit each on behalf of hourly and salaried employees), Waffle House 
(a prominent restaurant chain), and Georgia Power Company (the principal local utility). 
 152. See Judge Approves $12.1 Million Settlement in Part-Time Workers’ Lawsuit Against 
UPS, Daily Labor Report (BNA), April 14, 1999, at A-6; EEOC Says San Francisco Grocery 
Chain Agreed to Settle Bias Claims for $1.3 Million, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Jan. 23, 1988, 
at A-11. 
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crimination may have the effect of restricting their ability to bring 
claims on behalf of those similarly situated. 
It is a different question whether this irony is a problem that de-
mands a solution. There are sound reasons to tolerate a rule that lim-
its the maintenance of Title VII class actions. The problem of the 
“blackmail class” is not an academic one: the costs of such suits to 
employers are enormous and are unrelated to whether or not they 
have done anything wrong. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s optimistic 
footnote in Allison, settlement of such cases often has nothing to do 
with the merits of the claims and everything to do with the financial 
and public relations risks presented by the overwhelming scale of 
such actions. The limits placed on class actions by the 1991 Act may 
in turn limit the ease with which corporations can be browbeaten by 
an aggressive set of plaintiffs and their equally aggressive attorneys. 
This is not necessarily bad news for the cause of individual rights. 
While the 1991 Act may limit class actions, it arguably makes it eas-
ier for individual plaintiffs to get access to the courts. The availability 
of damages and attorney’s fees provides incentives for plaintiffs’ law-
yers to take such cases on a contingent-fee basis, which means that 
plaintiffs can bring suit without spending their own money to do 
so.153 In other words, employment discrimination suits are no longer 
negative value suits. While this diminishes their suitability for class 
treatment, it increases their odds of being brought individually, 
which for the individual is an equivalent opportunity for justice. 
Further, class actions are not necessary for certain types of wide-
ranging relief. Insofar as plaintiffs seek to end discriminatory prac-
tices in the workplace, such results are possible in individual suits. 
For example, a plaintiff who challenges a particular employment 
practice on his own behalf may succeed in having it declared invalid, 
to the benefit of both himself and all other current and future em-
ployees. Sweeping changes are therefore possible (though usually 
only prospectively) in nonclass cases. Moreover, the EEOC may file 
suit itself or intervene in a private suit to seek relief on behalf of oth-
ers similarly situated to the plaintiff.154 When the EEOC seeks such 
 
 153. And they have done so in increasing numbers. See supra note 15. 
 154. The EEOC has stated publicly that it intends to become more active in the pursuit 
of class-style claims. See EEOC: Expanded Mediation, More Class Actions in Agency’s Future, 
Officials Tell ABA Meeting, Daily Labor Report (BNA), March 26, 1999, at C-1. It has also 
taken an active role in the maintenance and settlement of several highly publicized class actions 
in past few years. See Mitsubishi Settles EEOC Suit for $34 Million, Agency Says Class, Amount 
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relief, even for a large class of persons, it is not required to satisfy the 
provisions of Rule 23 with its attendant constraints.155 Finally, in 
multiplaintiff cases, various efficiencies can be achieved through the 
use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which permits the sever-
ance and consolidation of individual claims. While such plaintiffs 
could not represent others, they still could bring aggregated claims 
that could be dealt with on a mass scale and could result in equitable 
relief that would benefit similarly situated employees. All of this 
means that the constraints imposed on Title VII class actions by the 
law and the civil rules are entirely compatible with a balancing of the 
interests of employees and employers as participants in the federal 
antidiscrimination scheme. It also means that Title VII class actions 
might not be missed as much as one might think should the 1991 
Act render them unsustainable in many cases, as seems likely.156 
Because the trend, at least at the appellate level, is toward re-
stricting Title VII class actions, it becomes a political question 
whether those restrictions should be eased or lifted. If Congress 
wanted to encourage or facilitate Title VII class actions, most, if not 
all, of the barriers to class certification could be obviated if the dam-
ages portions of the 1991 Act were modified or repealed. Many fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes lack a punitive or compensa-
tory damages provision, or both. If only liquidated damages were 
available under Title VII (based, for instance, on a multiple of back 
pay or simply on a sliding scale like the damages caps already in 
place), then the individualized damages that make class certifications 
problematic would be significantly streamlined. This would not alle-
viate the Seventh Amendment problem in large cases involving mul-
tiple juries. Nonetheless, it would be a step toward minimizing Sev-
enth Amendment issues, leaving more room for waivers and other 
devices that might facilitate a constitutional resolution of the issues. 
 
Largest Ever, Daily Labor Report (BNA), June 12, 1998, at AA-1; Publix Markets Agrees to 
Pay $81.5 Million to Settle Sex Bias Suit, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Jan. 27. 1997, at AA-1; 
EEOC, Texaco Settle Bias Charges with Plan for Monitoring Promotions, Daily Labor Report 
(BNA), Jan. 6. 1997, at AA-1. 
 155. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). 
 156. For a contrary view, see Harvey S. Bartlett III, Determining Whether a Title VII 
Plaintiff Class’s “Aim Is True”: The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. for Employment 
Discrimination Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TUL. L. REV. 2163 (2000). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has raised complex questions in the 
field of Title VII class actions, and it will likely take years, if not dec-
ades, before these issues are fully resolved. Until they are, or until 
Congress takes action to counter the apparent trend, these types of 
cases appear to be on their way to becoming significantly curtailed, 
at least where individual money damages are sought. Whether these 
developments will slow the filing and settlement of such cases only 
time will tell, but litigants who wish to bring or oppose such cases 
can no longer afford to ignore the implications of the 1991 remedies 
for class litigation. 
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